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An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious
Liability Under the Law of Agency
Under the law of agency, business principals often are held liable for
the torts of their agents.' If the victim of an agent's2 tortious conduct can
recover full compensation directly from the agent, however, the victim or-
dinarily has no reason to seek compensation from the agent's principal.3
The law of vicarious liability, therefore, exists primarily as a way to cope
with the problem of judgment-proof agents.4
An important basis for the imposition of vicarious liability on a busi-
ness principal is the existence of "control" or a right of "control" by the
principal over the physical conduct of his agent.' If a tort is committed
within the scope of the agent's employment,6 the existence of control is a
sufficient but not a necessary condition for the imposition of vicarious lia-
bility.7 The principal also incurs vicarious liability if his agent, in the
performance of his duties, commits a tort during the course of an "inher-
ently dangerous activity."
'8
Although these liability rules are widely in force, the theories advanced
to explain them are at best incomplete.' As a step toward a rigorous theo-
retical basis for explanation and reform of the law, this Note develops a
formal economic model of the principal-agent relationship to identify the
circumstances under which vicarious liability is and is not an efficient lia-
bility rule."°
1. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 458-75 (4th ed. 1971) (general survey of law of vicarious
liability).
2. The term "agent" is used in this Note to refer to all parties in the employ of business princi-
pals. It encompasses independent contractors who may or may not be agents in the legal sense of the
term. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 1-2 (1958) (defining "agent," "master,". "servant,"
"independent contractor").
3. Of course, the victim may have other motives for suing the principal-for example, to defeat
diversity jurisdiction.
4. This proposition is supported by the fact that principals generally have a common-law right of
indemnity against their agents. M. FRANKLIN, TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 390 (2d ed. 1979).
Unless the principal's right to indemnity is contractually abrogated, vicarious liability does not relieve
agents of liability up to the limit of their assets, but merely allows victims to reach principals' assets
when agents' assets are insufficient.
5. W. SELL, AGENCY 84 (1975).
6. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 461-66 (discussion of scope of employment limitation on
vicarious liability); W. SELL, supra note 5, at 88-93 (same).
7. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 458-75 (discussing possible bases for vicarious liability).
8. See id. at 472.
9. See pp. 171-73 infra.
10. Efficiency in this context refers to the attainment of a social wealth maximum; liability rule A
is more efficient than liability rule B if and only if A generates greater aggregate social wealth than B.
Because aggregate social wealth is the criterion of efficiency, A may be more efficient than B even
though some individuals are disadvantaged by A-this possibility distinguishes the social wealth max-
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Two factors are of critical importance in this efficiency analysis. One
factor is the extent to which financial incentives affect the level of precau-
tionary behavior. If precautionary behavior is unaffected by the financial
incentives created by alternative liability rules, then vicarious liability is
generally an efficient rule. When financial incentives significantly affect
the level of precautionary behavior, however, another factor is rele-
vant-the ability of the principal to monitor the agent's precautionary be-
havior. If the principal can monitor the adequacy of the agent's precau-
tions, then vicarious liability again is generally an efficient rule. If the
principal is unable to monitor the agent's precautionary behavior, how-
ever, vicarious liability may or may not be an efficient rule.
The existing law of agency differs significantly from the normative im-
plications of the proposed economic model. For example, the law largely
ignores the question of whether financial incentives affect precautionary
behavior. Moreover, although the principal's ability to "control" the agent
is a basis for the imposition of vicarious liability, the practical indicia of
control employed by the courts are only tangentially related to the ability
of the principal to monitor the agent's precautionary behavior. Despite
these problems, however, the legal treatment of inherently dangerous ac-
tivities is remarkably consistent with the normative implications of the
model.
I. The Law of Vicarious Liability and Its Historical Basis in Policy
The law of vicarious liability centers around the control test and its
exceptions. Many policy arguments have been advanced in support of the
law, but none of them provide adequate explanation or justification for
the law as it stands.
A. The Control Test and the Inherently Dangerous Activity Exception
Under agency law, an "agent" is a party who is hired by a business
entity to perform a task connected with the business, and a principal is a
party who employs an agent." Courts applying the control test distinguish
between two types of agents: servants and independent contractors.1 2 A
servant is an agent who is employed by a principal to perform services,
and whose physical conduct in the performance of those services is con-
trolled or is subject to a right of control by the principal.'" A principal
imization concept of efficiency from the concept of "Pareto optimality" employed elsewhere in this
Note. See p. 173 infra.
11. See note 2 supra.
12. These two classes of agents cover all individuals under contract to perform services for a
business principal. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
13. Id. § 2; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 460; H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, THE LAW OF
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who employs a servant is termed a master.1 4 Under the doctrine of respon-
deat superior, masters are liable for the torts of their servants if the torts
are committed within the scope of the servants' employment." In contrast,
an independent contractor is an agent who is under contract to perform
services for a principal, but whose physical conduct is neither controlled
nor subject to a right of control by the principal." In general, an employer
is not liable for the torts of an independent contractor."
Because the control test is applied in diverse situations, it is impossible
to provide a comprehensive listing of the factors that courts consider in
determining whether control exists.18 Among those factors 9, however, are
the extent of supervision upon which the parties agree, 0 whether the
agent is engaged in an occupation or business independent or distinct from
that of the principal," trade practices regarding the degree of supervision
that an employer normally exercises,22 the agent's skill level,23 whether the
employer supplies tools and the place of work, 4 the employer's power to
terminate the agency,25 the method of payment (by the hour or by the
AGENCY 99 (1979); W. SELL, supra note 5, at 84.
14. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 460; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 2 (1958).
15. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 460; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958).
16. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 468; H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 13, at 100;
W. SELL, supra note 5, at 95.
17. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 468; H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 13, at 100;
W. SELL, supra note 5, at 95; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 409 (1965). Exceptions to the
independent contractor rule include vicarious liability for non-delegable duties of the principal, W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 470; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 417-22, 424-25, 428 (1965),
liability when the agent acts under the apparent authority of the principal, RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 429 (1965), liability of the principal for his own negligence, id. §§ 410-15 (1965); W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 469, and liability for the results of inherently dangerous activities, W.
PROSSER, supra note 1, at 472; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 416, 423, 427 (1965).
18. Cf W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 460 (control test reduces to question of whether, "in the eyes
of the community, the person employed would be regarded as part of the employer's own working
staff").
19. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 460; W. SELL, supra note 5, at 86; RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1958).
20. See, e.g., Throop v. F.E. Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 151, 382 P.2d 560, 563 (1963); Sam
Home Motor and Implement Co. v. Gregg, 279 S.W.2d 755, 756 (Ky. 1955); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(a) (1958).
21. See, e.g., Holloway v. Nassar, 276 Mich. 212, 217, 267 N.W. 619, 621 (1936); Murray v.
Dwight, 161 N.Y. 301, 305, 55 N.E. 901, 902 (1910); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §
220(2)(b) (1958).
22. See, e.g., Consolidated Motors v. Ketcham, 49 Ariz. 295, 305-06, 66 P.2d 246, 250 (1937);
Sam Home Motor and Implement Co. v. Gregg, 279 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Ky. 1955); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(c) (1958).
23. See, e.g., Perguica v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 29 Cal. 2d 857, 860, 179 P.2d 812, 814
(1947); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(d) (1958); ef. Giannelli v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 307 Mass. 18, 20, 29 N.E.2d 124, 126 (1940) (physician held not to be servant because not
subject to control while conducting medical examination).
24. See, e.g., Fearn v. Ralph Hamlin, Inc., 215 Cal. 211, 213-14, 8 P.2d 1015, 1015-16 (1932);
Robert Beuhl & Co. v. Danaher, 127 Conn. 606, 611, 18 A.2d 697, 699 (1941); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(e) (1958).
25. See, e.g., Charles Freeland & Sons, Inc. v. Couplin, 211 Md. 160, 169, 126 A.2d 606, 611
(1956); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(f) (1958).
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job),2" whether the agent's work is part of the employer's regular busi-
ness,27 and whether the parties believe they are creating a master-servant
relation."
If the court determines that control is absent, then the principal is not
liable for the agent's tort unless the tort arises out of an activity that falls
under one or more of the exceptions to the independent contractor rule. 9
One such exception includes torts that an agent commits during the course
of an inherently dangerous activity?0 Many cases that fall under this ex-
ception arise when the tortfeasor creates an unusual risk that is recogniza-
ble in advance, and that requires special precautions to guard against an
undue risk of harm?1 Other cases that fall under this exception involve
"ultrahazardous" activities, which are considered inherently dangerous re-
gardless of the precautions taken? 2
B. The Rationale for Vicarious Liability
Many theories have been advanced to support or explain the law of
vicarious liability.3 Although they all contain a kernel of truth, none of
the theories provides an adequate policy basis for the law. Three of the
more prominent theories are examined below.
1. The Principals Benefit Theory
According to one proposed justification for vicarious liability, the princi-
pal should bear the costs of the agent's endeavors because he reaps the
26. See, e.g., Mitchem v. Shearman Concrete Pipe Co., 45 Ga. App. 809, 809, 165 S.E. 889, 889
(1932); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(g) (1958).
27. See, e.g., Sam Horne Motor and Implement Co. v. Gregg, 279 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Ky. 1955);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(h) (1958).
28. See, e.g., Sam Home Motor and Implement Co. v. Gregg, 279 S.W.2d 755, 757 (Ky. 1955);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2)(i) (1958). But see Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin,
148 Tex. 175, 178, 222 S.W.2d 995, 997 (1949) (denying importance of parties' beliefs about exis-
tence of master-servant relation).
29. Exceptions outside the scope of the model in this Note include the negligence of the employer
exception, see W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 469, and the apparent authority exception, see M.
FRANKLIN, supra note 4, at 368. An exception at least partially within the scope of the model, though
not discussed in the text, is the non-delegable duty exception. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 470.
30. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 472.
31. Id.
32. Ultrahazardous activities include the construction of reservoirs, see Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R.
3 E. & I. App. 330 (1868); the keeping of vicious animals, see Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Gordon, 184
Miss. 885, 186 So. 631 (1939); the exhibition of fireworks, see Blue Grass Fair Ass'n v. Bunnell, 206
Ky. 462, 267 S.W. 237 (1924); blasting activities, see Giem v. Williams, 215 Ark. 705, 222 S.W.2d
800 (1949); and crop dusting, see Pendergrass v. Lovelace, 57 N.M. 661, 262 P.2d 231 (1953).
33. See T. BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY 148 (1916) (considering nine theories of vicarious liability
and rejecting all as inadequate). See also P. ATIYAH, VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN THE LAW OF TORTS 15-
28 (1967) (reassessing Baty's nine theories, and concluding that true basis for vicarious liability may
lie in some unspecified combination of those theories and modern theory of loss distribution).
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benefits of those endeavors. 4 Stated this simply, however, the principal's
benefit theory does not explain any of the limitations on vicarious liability
that are discussed above. Benefits accrue to the principal in any agency
relationship regardless of the degree of control. Thus, as stated, the princi-
pal's benefit theory fails to provide a cogent basis for the law.
2. Loss-Spreading and Deep-Pocket Theories
Another proposed justification for vicarious liability is that it spreads
the costs of torts to principals with "deeper pockets" than their agents and
to society as a whole through higher prices for the principals' goods and
services." The loss-spreading and deep-pocket arguments do not define
appropriate limits to the scope of vicarious liability, however, because
broadening the scope of vicarious liability could spread losses even further.
Moreover, loss-spreading arguments do not suggest a reason for treating
control as a crucial variable in vicarious liability cases. To the contrary,
they suggest that the law should look to the relative affluence of the par-
ties to the action. Hence, loss spreading and the search for a deep pocket
cannot be the sole basis for the law of vicarious liability.
3. The Cost Internalization Theory
The third commonly proposed justification for vicarious liability is that
it forces internalization of social accident costs36-that is, it guarantees
that no agency activity is undertaken unless the principal and the agent
together are willing to bear the tort costs of the activity. Such a policy, it
is argued, promotes an efficient allocation of resources. 7
The cost internalization theory, however, does not adequately explain
why principals should internalize the tort costs of servants but not the tort
costs of independent contractors. Especially when the independent con-
tractor is judgment proof, as is commonly the case when the vicarious
liability issue is actively litigated, the only party capable of internalizing
tort costs (other than the victim) is the principal. Moreover, the cost inter-
nalization argument neglects the incentive effects of alternative liability
rules. Specifically, it neglects the problem of "moral hazard"-the danger
that if the risks of tort liability are shifted from the agent to the principal
34. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 33, at 17; T. BATY, supra note 33, at 148.
35. See, e.g., P. ATIYAH, supra note 33, at 22-23; W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 459; cf. G.
CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 39 (1970) (discussion of loss-spreading).
36. Cf Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499,
543-47 (1961) (discussing respondeat superior and independent contractor rule); Toner, Liability of
Oil Companies for the Torts of Service Station Operators, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 263 (1972)
(arguing for imposition of vicarious liability on oil companies).
37. Cf Calabresi, supra note 36, at 543-45 (discussing respondeat superior).
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through vicarious liability, the agent's incentives to exercise care may be
reduced.
38
If. A Formal Model of Agency Under Alternative Liability Rules
When a principal and an agent create an enterprise, their first task is to
negotiate an agency agreement. The agreement must identify the various
duties of the parties in the conduct of the enterprise, and must specify how
the returns from the enterprise are to be split between the parties. In
addition, if the possibility of tort liability is foreseen and is sufficiently
significant to warrant attention, the agreement must allocate the risks of
tort liability.
During negotiations, each party seeks a contract that maximizes his
own welfare. The goals of the principal and the agent come into conflict
as each party endeavors to increase his share of the returns to the enter-
prise at the expense of the other party. Both parties must also cooperate,
however, as they perceive the need to achieve agreement lest the mutual
benefits of the enterprise be lost. The ultimate outcome of this give-and-
take process depends upon factors such as the degree of market power that
each party possesses, and the ability of each party to bargain skillfully.
Although the outcome of bargaining is impossible to predict with cer-
tainty, the presence of indeterminacy is not fatal to a meaningful economic
analysis of the negotiation process." Crucial policy implications for the
law of vicarious liability can be derived from the simple assumption that
bargaining leads to a "Pareto optimal" agency contract-a contract that
could not be modified so as to make both parties better off.4°
The implications of the Pareto optimality assumption for the law of
vicarious liability depend, in part, upon the nature of the activity that
creates the risk of a tort. For purposes of efficiency analysis, enterprise
activities that create a risk of tort liability can be divided roughly into
three categories, based upon the extent to which the precautionary behav-
ior41 of the enterprise is affected by financial incentives, and the extent to
which the principal can monitor the precautionary behavior of the agent.
The model developed below analyzes enterprise behavior for each type
of activity-first under a legal regime without vicarious liability, and then
under a legal regime with vicarious liability. By comparing enterprise be-
38. See pp. 186-87 infra; app. VI infra.
39. See app. I infra (discussing why collective action and market forces fail to produce efficiency
irrespective of liability rule).
40. Although the Pareto optimality assumption is intuitively appealing, it does rule out the use of
destructive bargaining tactics that would destroy the Pareto optimality of the bargaining outcome, and
it presumes that the bargaining process proceeds until a Pareto optimal contract is identified.
41. In general, precautionary behavior includes any action designed to reduce the likelihood or
magnitude of tort liability.
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havior under the two regimes, the analysis generates a set of conclusions
as to the efficient liability rule for each type of activity.
A. Financial Incentives, Monitoring, and Precautionary Behavior
In the model below, potentially tortious activities are divided into three
categories: incentive-independent activities, principal-monitored activities,
and agent-monitored activities. Concededly, real enterprise activities rarely
fall neatly into one category or another, and the problem of generalizing
the analysis to encompass "intermediate activities" is considered after the
development of the model.42
Incentive-Independent Activities. In activities that belong to this cate-
gory, the extent to which the agent takes precautions to reduce the risk of
torts is not influenced by the financial incentives generated by the tort
system. As a result, whether or not the principal is vicariously liable for
the agent's torts, the probability and potential magnitude of tort liability
remain the same.
Three groups of activities fall under this category. The first group con-
sists of activities in which, regardless of the liability rule, the costs of
available precautions either always exceed their benefits, or never exceed
their benefits. 41 A second and far more important group of incentive-inde-
pendent activities consists of activities in which the level of care is deter-
mined without conscious regard for the danger of tort liability, and the
potential tortfeasor's decisionmaking suffers from "bounded rationality. 44
In such activities, the risk of tort liability is attributable primarily to mo-
mentary carelessness rather than to a calculated decision to disregard pru-
dent standards of care. 4 That is, the decisionmaker does not choose the
level of care by weighing the relevant costs and benefits, including those
created by the tort system, but instead acts without serious attention to the
relevant costs and benefits. The third group of incentive-independent ac-
tivities consists of activities that create a de minimis risk of tort liability.
In these activities, the parties do not balance the costs and benefits of pre-
cautions because the costs of assessing the relevant costs and benefits ex-
ceed the potential benefits of doing so-it is irrational to choose precau-
42. See pp. 189-90 infra.
43. Relatively few activities fit this description, but examples may be found in the legal category
of ultrahazardous activities. See M. FRANKLIN, supra note 4, at 392-420, p. 55 infra (discussing
similarity between incentive-independent activities and ultrahazardous activities).
44. The term "bounded rationality" is used extensively in the economics literature to refer to a
wide variety of human cognitive shortcomings. See, e.g., Simon, Rationality and Administrative Ded-
sionmaking, in MODELS OF MAN 196 (1957); Simon, Theories of Bounded Rationality, in DECISION
AND ORGANIZATION 161 (C. McGuire & R. Radner eds. 1972).
45. For example, many motor vehicle torts may result primarily from lapses of attention and
periods of fatigue rather than from conscious decisions to drive imprudently.
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tionary behavior carefully because the danger of a tort is so small.
Principal-Monitored Activities. In activities that belong to this category,
principals' and agents' decisions about precautionary behavior depend
upon financial incentives to exercise care, and the principal can contractu-
ally specify and easily monitor the level of care to be exercised by the
agent. Thus, in contrast to decisionmaking in incentive-independent activi-
ties, both the principal and the agent choose their precautionary behavior
with reference to all of the relevant costs and benefits, and the danger of
tort liability is not so minimal that it is irrational to examine the financial
incentives created by the tort system.46
Agent-Monitored Activities. In activities that belong to this category,
decisions about precautionary behavior are influenced by financial incen-
tives to exercise care, but the level of care is under the exclusive control of
the agent due to the principal's inability to monitor the agent's precau-
tionary efforts. The agent, however, does consider the relevant costs and
benefits in choosing the level of care. The risk of tort liability is not de
minimis, and the agent's decisionmaking takes into account the financial
incentives created by the tort system.
In typical agent-monitored activities, it is infeasible or prohibitively
costly for the principal to observe the behavior of the agent. As a conse-
quence, contractual requirements pertaining to the agent's precautionary
behavior are unenforceable, and the agent chooses the level of precaution-
ary behavior solely on the basis of his own financial incentives.47
Intermediate Activities. The three categories of activities defined above
are not meant to be exhaustive of all possible principal-agent activities.
Although iicentive-independent activities are a distinct class, principal-
monitored and agent-monitored activities are two ends of a continuum. At
46. As an example of a principal-monitored activity, consider a construction project in which the
only risk of a tort is the possibility that an unwitting individual may wander onto the site and be
injured. The enterprise, comprised of a developer (principal) and a builder (agent), faces the decision
of what type of fence, if any, to build around the construction project. Because the parties realize that
construction sites are dangerous and accidents frequently occur, they consciously contemplate the costs
and benefits of alternative safety precautions. Assuming that the risk of tort liability is not de minimis,
then the financial incentives that confront the parties, including those created by the tort system, have
an impact on the choice of precautionary behavior. Finally, because the existence of a fence is easily
verifiable, the principal can (almost) costlessly monitor the implementation of a contractual require-
ment that the agent erect a particular type of fence.
47. As an example of an agent-monitored activity, suppose that the operator (agent) of a service
station affiliated with a major oil company (principal) is responsible for keeping the station free of
safety hazards, such as patches of grease in the service area. Clean-up personnel are costly, and the
agent is influenced by financial incentives in choosing the amount of clean-up services to purchase.
Moreover, because the risk of tort liability is not de minimis, the financial incentives created by the
tort system are among the factors influencing the agent's decision. The principal has only infrequent
contact with the agent, however, and hence the principal has no effective way of verifying that the
agent keeps the premises consistently free of hazards. The principal cannot monitor the level of care,
and the agent can select the level of precautionary behavior with reference only to his own financial
incentives.
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one end, monitoring is essentially costless, and at the other end, monitor-
ing is infeasible or prohibitively costly. Between these endpoints lie many
agency activities in which monitoring is feasible at a significant positive
cost that is not always prohibitive. For purposes of the formal model be-
low, however, the abstraction afforded by considering only the endpoints
of the continuum is an essential simplification. Once the analysis of the
formal model is complete, the results will be generalized to encompass the
intermediate cases.
B. Optimal Agency Contracts in the Absence of Vicarious Liability
In the model below, a principal and an agent join to create an enter-
prise. The components of enterprise profit, exclusive of tort liability, are
assumed to be known with certainty at the time the enterprise is formed,
and are denoted by7r. The parties perceive tort liability as a random vari-
able, which is beyond their control in incentive-independent activities, but
which can be influenced by expenditures on precautionary behavior in
principal-monitored and agent-monitored activities.
In general, the exposure of an enterprise to tort liability depends upon
what torts are committed, the damages that they cause, whether injured
persons seek recovery, and ultimately, the amount of damages that a court
awards. In the analysis that follows, all of these factors are collapsed into
a single random variable, X, which represents tort damages payable by
the enterprise."
In this model, there are two states of nature: a no-accident state in
which damages payable, X, are equal to zero, and an accident state in
which damages payable are equal to a fixed amount x"' It is assumed that
the principal and the agent seek to maximize their expected utility, which
is a function of wealth. The utility functions of the principal and the
algent are given by V(w) and U(w), respectively, where w denotes
wealth.50 If the negotiated contract is Pareto optimal, as assumed above,
48. X also includes any litigation or settlement costs.
49. It is important to note several limitations of the model. First, the model implicitly assumes
that the enterprise cannot insure against the risk of tort liability. Although the availability of liability
insurance may affect the optimal agency contract, a formal extension of the model to allow for insur-
ance would complicate the analysis unnecessarily, and would lead to substantially the same conclu-
sions with regard to the efficient liability rule.
In addition, the model covers only one time period, and it therefore neglects the effects of future
opportunities on current behavior (and vice-versa). The model also suppresses some interesting aspects
of corporate law and bankruptcy law, such as the ability of the enterprise to limit tort liability
through incorporation, and the ability of insolvent individuals to retain a portion of their assets in
bankruptcy. While both of these limitations raise interesting economic issues, they do not significantly
affect the qualitative results.
50. V(w) and U(w) are Von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions, and their existence requires
that the preferences of the principal and the agent satisfy certain axioms. See J. VON NEUMANN & 0.
MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 15-29 (1944) (original exposition of
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then no alternative contract can improve the expected utility of both
parties. 1
Before proceeding, it is necessary to introduce the following additional
notation. Let
m0, y0 = the initial wealth levels of the principal and agent,
respectively;
ran, Yn = the amount of enterprise income allocated to the principal and
agent, respectively, in the no-accident state; and let
Ma, Ya = the amount of enterprise income allocated to the principal and
agent, respectively, in the accident state.
The principal and the agent must negotiate a contract under which en-
terprise income is allocated between the two of them. Because they know
that two states of nature can occur, their allocation scheme must provide
for a division of enterprise income contingent upon each state of nature.
Their negotiations, therefore, produce a set of values for mn, Ma, Yn and
Ya" In addition, in principal-monitored and agent-monitored activities, the
negotiations will determine the level of precautionary behavior. Whatever
the outcome of the negotiations, the payoffs to each party must be large
enough for that party to find participation in the enterprise worth-
while-each party must find the enterprise at least as attractive as his best
alternative.
The allotments of enterprise income to the principal, mn and ma, and
to the agent, Yn and ya, depend upon their relative bargaining strength.
Bargaining strength, however, is not directly relevant to the model or to
its policy implications. 2
Under the law of fraudulent conveyance, transfers of wealth from the
agent to the principal are legally invalid if they render the agent unable to
pay damages 3.5 Thus, in the accident state of nature, the agent's initial
wealth, yo, cannot be transferred legally to the principal if such a transfer
would leave the agent with an amount less than the amount of tort liabil-
ity, x. If x is less than y0, therefore, the agency contract cannot legally
render the agent judgment proof. If x is greater than y0, however, the
agent is potentially judgment proof to the extent of x-y0, the difference
between his tort liability and his initial wealth.
Because the law of vicarious liability raises interesting economic issues
expected utility theory); Herstein and Milnor, An Axiomatic Approach to Expected Utility, 21
ECONOMETRICA 291 (1953) (classic axiomatic exposition). See also R. LUCE & D. RAIFFA, GAMES
AND DECISIONS 12-38 (1957) (less general but more readable axiomatic treatment).
51. The Pareto optimality assumption is quite weak in that it implies little more than the collec-
tive rationality of the bargaining process. But see note 40 supra.
52. See p. 173 supra.
53. See S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 2013 (3d ed. 1978).
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only if the agent is judgment proof, 4 it is assumed throughout the model
that tort liability, x, exceeds the agent's initial wealth, y0. Thus, under the
law of fraudulent conveyance, no portion of the agent's initial wealth, y0,
can be transferred legally to the principal in the accident state, and the
agent's allotment of enterprise income in the accident state, Ya, cannot be
negative."5
1. Optimal Agency Contracts for Enterprises Conducting Incentive-
Independent Activities
Because financial incentives do not affect the level of precautionary be-
havior in incentive-independent activities, the principal and the agent do
not choose the level of precautionary behavior when they negotiate the
agency contract. In the negotiation process, the probability of a tort result-
ing in damages, p, and the magnitude of the damages, x, are treated as
constants.5 6
The expected utility that the principal derives from any agency contract
is equal to the probability-weighted average of the utility that he would
derive from his wealth if no tort were to occur and the utility that he
would derive from his wealth if a tort were to occur. Symbolically, his
expected utility is represented by
E[V(w)] - (1-p)V(m 0+mn) + pV(mo+ma)
The expected utility that the agent derives from an agency contract is
conceptually similar: a probability-weighted average of the utility of his
wealth in each state of nature. Because the agent may be insolvent in the
accident state of nature, however, the symbolic representation of the
agent's expected utility is more complex. Specifically, if tort damages, x,
exceed the sum of the agent's initial wealth, y0, and the agent's allocation
of income in the accident state, Ya, the agent's wealth in the accident state
is zero. If the reverse relationship holds, then the agent's wealth in the
accident state is positive, equal to yo+Ya-x.
Symbolically, the agent's expected utility is represented by
E[U(w)] = (1-p)U(yo+y n) + pU(y0 +ya-x)
if yo+ya > x, or
54. If the agent is not judgment proof, then any Pareto optimal agency agreement in the absence
of vicarious liability can be contractually recreated after the imposition of vicarious liability. Thus,
vicarious liability has no effect on enterprises that are not judgment proof in the absence of vicarious
liability. See p. 185 infra; app. IV infra.
55. Under these circumstances, the agent legally may become partially judgment proof under the
agency contract if Ya is sufficiently small.
56. That is, Prob(X=x)=p, and Prob(X=0)-(1-p).
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E[U(w)I = (1-p)U(yo+y n) + pU(O)
if YO + Ya < x
A Pareto optimal contract requires that each party's expected utility be
at a maximum given the level of the other party's expected utility. Thus,
given a level of utility for the principal, denoted by V* in the model be-
low, a Pareto optimal contract can be found by maximizing the agent's
expected utility subject to the constraint that the principal attain the util-
ity level V*. By varying the choice of V*, other Pareto optimal contracts
can be found, although for purposes of analysis it is sufficient to treat V*
as an arbitrary parameter.
In addition to the constraint incorporating V*, there are other con-
straints on the maximization problem that reflect logically necessary rela-
tionships between the choice variables, and there is a constraint that re-
flects the law of fraudulent conveyance.
Formally, the problem is to:
maximize E[U(w)] over all possible values of mn, Ma, Yn, Ya,
subject to the .following constraints:
(1) E[V(w) : V*
(2) ma-+ya =7r, mn-y n <7r,
(3) mn < yo + 7r, ma < y0 + 7, yn _-< m0+ 7r, ya < m0 +7, and
(4) ya 0,
where V* is the principal's expected utility under the contract, and 7
is enterprise income.1
7
Constraint (1) says that the principal's level of utility must at least
equal V*. Constraints (2) ensure that the contractual allocation of enter-
prise income in each state of nature does not exceed total enterprise in-
come."8 Constraints (3) ensure that the contractual allocation of enterprise
wealth to each party in each state of nature does not exceed the sum of
enterprise income and the other party's initial wealth. 9 Constraint (4)
ensures that the contract does not violate the law of fraudulent
57. In obtaining the solution to this problem, it is assumed that U(w) and V(w) are both strictly
increasing (the marginal utility of wealth is always positive) and concave (the marginal utility of
wealth decreases or remains constant as wealth increases). These assumptions imply that both the
principal and the agent are either risk averse or risk neutral. See H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANAL-
YSIS 108 (1978).
58. A positive marginal utility of wealth ensures that all enterprise wealth will be allocated to one
party or the other, and hence constraints (2) hold with equality at the optimum.
59. It is assumed that the bargaining process renders three of these constraints non-binding. In
particular, it is assumed that, at the optimum, yn < m0 + 7r, Ya < m0 + 7r, and mn < ya+ 7r. In
addition, the fraudulent conveyance constraint insures that ma < Y0 + - at the optimum. Thus, for
practical purposes, constraints (3) have no impact on the solution to the problem.
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conveyance."
The solution to this maximization problem is obtained in three stages.6"
First, the optimal solvency contract is derived: the optimal solvency con-
tract is the best contract that the principal and the agent can devise that
leaves the agent solvent in the accident state. Second, the optimal judg-
ment-proof contract is derived: the optimal judgment-proof contract is the
best contract that the principal and the agent can devise that leaves the
agent insolvent in the accident state. Finally, the Pareto optimal contract
is found by comparing the optimal solvency contract with the optimal
judgment-proof contract. Because the principal receives an expected utility
of V* under both contracts, the contract that provides the agent with the
greatest expected utility is the Pareto optimal contract.
The Optimal Solvency Contract. For the agent to be solvent in the
accident state, his initial wealth plus his allotment of enterprise income
must be sufficient to pay tort damages in full. That is, Y0+Ya ?= x. This
fact, coupled with previous assumptions,62 greatly simplifies the original
statement of the optimization problem. Specifically, the optimal solvency
contract represents the solution to the following problem:
maximize E[U(w)] over all possible values of Yn,Ya,
subject to the constraints:
E[V(w)] = (1-p)V(mo+7r-yn) + pV(mo+rr-ya) > V*
Yo+Ya > x.
If the optimal solvency contract" is to be a viable candidate for the
Pareto optimal contract," the marginal rate of substitution between
60. See pp. 177-78.
61. The three stage procedure is not merely a matter of expositional convenience. Because the
agent's expected utility function is not differentiable at the point Y0+Ya = x, it is mathematically
essential to optimize separately over the two subintervals y0+Ya > x and y0+Ya < x, and then to
compare the two resultant optima to determine the overall optimum.
62. See notes 58-59 supra, and recall the prior assumption that x > y0 . See pp. 177-78 supra.
63. Using Lagrange multipliers X and -q for the constraint on the principal's utility and the
constraint on the agent's allotment of enterprise income in the accident state, respectively, the follow-
ing conditions characterize the optimal solvency contract:
(a) (1-p)U'(y 0+yn) - X(1-p)V'(m0 + ir-yn) = 0
(b) pU'(y0 +ya-x) -XpV'(m 0 +wr-ya) + 4 = 0
(c) ya > x-Y0 ; 71 (y0+ya-x) = 0
(d) (1-p)V(m 0 + "r-yn) + pV(m 0 + r-ya) = V*
Because the objective function is concave in Yn and Ya, and the constraints are convex in Yn and Ya,
conditions (a)-(d) are necessary and sufficient for a global optimum to the problem of computing the
optimal solvency contract. See H. VARIAN, supra note 57, at 258-67. Condition (d) holds with strict
equality because the marginal utility of wealth is assumed to be positive. See note 57 supra.
64. The solution to this problem may entail setting ya = x-y0 , but such a solution can never be
Pareto optimal because a decrease in ya below that point would increase the principal's utility without
reducing the agent's utility. That is, when Ya = x-y0 , a decrease in Ya is, in effect, a transfer from
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wealth in each state of nature must be the same for both parties.65 That is,
U'(yo+Yn) V'(mo +r-yn)
U'(Yo+Ya-X) V'(mo +-7-Ya)
If this condition is violated, one party can trade income in the no-accident
state to the other party in return for income in the accident state, thereby
rendering one or both parties better off. This is a classic condition for
optimal risk sharing first analyzed in the economic theory of optimal in-
surance contracts.6 In this model, as in the theory of optimal insurance
contracts, the above condition determines how the risk of tort liability is
allocated 67 between the principal and the agent under the optimal solvency
contract.
The Optimal Judgment-Proof Contract. In a judgment proof enter-
prise, all of the agent's wealth is paid to the tort victim as compensation in
the accident state of nature. The optimal judgment-proof contract will
minimize the agent's gross wealth (exclusive of tort liability) in the acci-
dent state, therefore, subject to the law of fraudulent conveyance. Hence,
the agent's allotment of enterprise income in the accident state, Ya, will be
set as low as possible, thereby maximizing the principal's wealth in the
accident state, and minimizing the amount of compensation paid to the
tort victim. The agent's income in the no-accident state compensates him
for participating in such an arrangement.
Because the law of fraudulent conveyance does not allow the agent to
transfer wealth to the principal in the accident state of nature,' the
agent's allotment of enterprise income in the accident state, Ya, is set equal
to zero, and the tort victim receives partial compensation equal to the
agent's initial wealth of y0. The tort victim has a legal entitlement to full
compensation of x, however, and hence the optimal judgment-proof con-
the tort victim to the principal. Thus, if the optimal solvency contract is to be a candidate for the
Pareto optimal contract, it must satisfy Ya > x-y0 , which in turns implies that 71 = 0 in conditions
(b) and (c), note 63 supra.
65. This result follows from conditions (a) and (b), note 63 supra. Setting 77 0 in condition
(b), solving both equations for X, setting the results equal to one another, and rearranging terms
provides the necessary algebra.
66. See Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV.
941, 969-73 (1963) (mathematical appendix discussing optimal risk sharing);Borch, The Safety Load-
ing of Reinsurance Premiums, 43 SKANDANAVISK AKTUARIETIDSSKRIFT 163 (1960) (developing gen-
eral conditions for optimal risk sharing).
67. For example, the equality between the parties' marginal rates of substitution has the following
implications for optimal risk-sharing: If the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse, then
the agent's wealth is constant across states of nature-hence, yn=Y-X. If the agent is risk neutral and
the principal is risk averse, then the principal's wealth is constant across states of nature-hence,
yn=ya . If both parties are risk averse, then the risk of tort liability is shared-hence, Ya > Yn, and
Ya-x < Yn Cf Shavell, Sharing Risks of Deferred Payment, 84 J. POL. ECON. 161 (1976) (general
model of optimal risk sharing).
68. See pp. 177-78 supra (discussing law of fraudulent conveyance).
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tract effectively transfers to the enterprise part of the tort victim's
entitlement.
To complete the characterization of the optimal judgment proof con-
tract, note that once the principal's utility level V* is determined, and ya
is set equal to zero in the expression for the principal's expected utility,
that expression becomes a single equation in a single unknown, Yn" One
can then calculate the agent's allotment of enterprise income in the no-
accident state. That is, Yn satisfies
(1-p)V(mo+7r-yn) + pV(mo+7r) = V*.
The Pareto Optimal Contract. Because the principal receives the same
expected utility, V*, under both the optimal solvency contract and the op-
timal judgment-proof contract, the Pareto optimal contract is the contract
that gives the agent the greatest expected utility. Depending upon whether
the optimal solvency contract or the optimal judgment-proof contract is
chosen,6 19 a tort victim will either be fully compensated or partially com-
pensated for his losses. The economic effects of vicarious liability, there-
fore, depend largely on which of the two contracts is chosen.0
2. Optimal Agency Relationships for Enterprises Conducting Principal-
Monitored Activities.
In principal-monitored activities, decisions about precautionary behav-
ior depend upon financial incentives, and the parties to the enterprise
jointly choose an optimal level of precautionary behavior that the princi-
69. Three factors are especially important to the choice between the optimal solvency contract and
the optimal judgment-proof contract.
(i) If both the principal and the agent are risk neutral-that is, if both are concerned exclusively
with the expected value of their wealth-then the optimal judgment-proof contract is Pareto optimal
because it maximizes the expected net income of the enterprise. This follows from the fact that the
optimal judgment-proof contract minimizes the expected value of tort compensation paid by the enter-
prise, subject to the fraudulent conveyance constraint.
If the agent is risk averse, however, he is willing to accept a reduction in expected wealth to insure
against insolvency. If the agent is sufficiently risk averse, therefore, he will prefer the optimal solvency
contract to the optimal judgment-proof contract, even though his expected wealth is greater under the
latter contract.
(ii) As the loss x increases with the probability of liability fixed at p, the expected profit of the
enterprise decreases under the optimal solvency contract. To keep the principal at the expected utility
level V*, therefore, the agent must give up more and more income under that contract in one or both
states of nature. Thus, the larger the potential loss x for a given value of V*, the more likely it is that
the parties will prefer the optimal judgment-proof contract to the optimal solvency contract.
(iii) As the agent's initial wealth y0 increases, holding x constant, the payment to the tort victim
under the optimal judgment-proof contract also increases. Thus, as y0 increases, the optimal judg-
ment-proof contract becomes increasingly ineffective as a way for the enterprise to evade tort liability.
If the agent is risk averse, the risk-sharing advantages of the optimal solvency contract eventually will
dominate. Hence, the larger the value of y0 relative to the potential liability x, the more likely it is
that the parties will prefer the optimal solvency contract to the optimal judgment-proof contract.
70. See pp. 185-87 infra.
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pal can enforce upon the agent. In contrast to incentive-independent activ-
ities, the parties must decide not only on the allocation of risks in the two
states of nature, but also on the magnitude of those risks.
Optimal agency contracts for principal-monitored activities can be de-
termined the same way as optimal agency contracts for incentive-indepen-
dent activities.7 In selecting a Pareto optimal contract, the principal and
the agent compare the optimal solvency contract, which protects the agent
against insolvency in the event of a tort, with the optimal judgment-proof
contract, which places the entire risk of tort liability on the agent but
compensates him for bearing the attendant risk of insolvency with addi-
tional income in the no-accident state of nature.
In both the optimal solvency contract and the optimal judgment-proof
contract, the principal and the agent must select the desired level of pre-
cautionary behavior. These selections depend upon a comparison between
the marginal costs and marginal benefits of precautions under each con-
tract.72 Once the parties agree upon a level of precautionary behavior, the
principal can supervise the agent sufficiently well to insure his adherence
to the contract's provisions regarding the appropriate level of care.
3. Optimal Agency Relationships for Enterprises Conducting Agent-
Monitored Activities
In agent-monitored activities, financial incentives affect the level of pre-
cautionary expenditures, but the principal cannot monitor the agent.
Hence, a jointly determined level of precautionary behavior is unenforce-
able, and the agent will choose the level of precautionary behavior so as to
maximize his own utility without taking into account favorable or adverse
effects on the principal's utility. For this reason, the Pareto optimal
agency contract attainable for principal-monitored activities is generally,
though not always, unattainable for agent-monitored activities.73
The agency problem in an agent-monitored activity is analogous to the
problem faced by insurance companies in the presence of "moral haz-
ard,"74 and it can be treated analytically as a moral hazard problem. 5
71. See app. II infra (developing agency model for principal-monitored activities).
72. See app. II infra.
73. Cf Ross, On the Economic Theory of Agency and the Principle of Similarity, in ESSAYS ON
EcONOMIC BEHAVIOR UNDER UNCERTAINTY 215 (M. Balch, D. McFadden, & S. Wu eds. 1974)
(discussing the attainability of optimality in agency contracts).
74. In the insurance context, the moral hazard problem arises when an insured party takes advan-
tage of an insurance policy by reducing his efforts to avoid the occurrence of events covered by the
insurance policy. An extreme example is an act of arson committed for the purpose of collecting on an
insurance policy. A less extreme example is a degree of laxity in fire safety precautions attributable to
the insured's knowledge that the risk of fire is borne by the insurance company.
75. See, e.g., Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979); Shavell,
Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship, 10 BELL J. ECON. 55 (1979).
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Omitting the formal analysis of optimal agency contracts under moral
hazard,76 the central feature of the problem is that the agent selects the
level of precautionary behavior, in a self-serving fashion, after the alloca-
tion of enterprise income in the two states of nature has been negotiated."
The principal is not blind to the agent's self-serving behavior, however,
and the negotiated payoffs to the agent are chosen to motivate him to
behave, as much as possible, in accordance with the interests of the princi-
pal. Nonetheless, once the agent's payoffs are determined he is free to
select precautionary expenditures so that, from his perspective, the margi-
nal benefits of the precautions are commensurate with their marginal
costs.78
As with incentive-independent and principal-monitored activities, the
optimal contract for agent-monitored activities may or may not leave the
agent insolvent in the accident state. Thus, in the absence of vicarious
liability, the tort victim may or may not receive full compensation.
4. Summary
Whatever the enterprise activity, the absence of vicarious liability af-
fords the principal and the agent an opportunity to execute an optimal
judgment-proof contract, which leaves the agent insolvent in the accident
state of nature, and which partially evades the tort victim's right to com-
pensation. In return for bearing the entire risk of tort liability under such
a contract, the principal compensates the agent with additional income in
the no-accident state of nature.
The parties may choose an alternative contract, however, in which the
risk of tort liability is distributed between the principal and the agent in
accordance with their attitudes toward risk bearing. Such optimal solvency
contracts resemble insurance agreements. The principal, in effect, provides
the agent with full or partial insurance against the risk of tort liability.
Absent additional assumptions about the preferences and financial posi-
tions of the principal and the agent, it is impossible to predict which type
of contract they will choose.79 The optimal judgment-proof contract af-
76. For approaches to the solution of this problem, see Holmstrom, supra note 75; Ross, supra
note 73; Ross, The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 134
(1973); Shavell, supra note 75; Shavell, On Moral Hazard and Insurance, 93 Q.J. ECON. 541 (1979);
Grossman & Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (July 1980) (Univ. Pa. Center for
Analytic Research in Economics and the Social Sciences Working Paper #80-17) (on file with Yale
Law Journal).
77. See app. III infra (discussing choice of precautionary behavior by agent in agent-monitored
activity).
78. See app. III infra (interpreting conditions that determine agent's choice of precautionary
behavior).
79. See note 69 supra (discussing choice between optimal solvency contract and optimal judgment-
proof contract in incentive-independent activities).
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fords to the parties the advantage of partial liability avoidance, but it
places the agent in a highly "risky" position that he may be hesitant to
accept. The optimal solvency contract, in contrast, spreads the risk be-
tween the parties in accordance with their willingness to bear risk, but
sacrifices the benefits of liability avoidance.
In addition to this choice between risk distribution and liability avoid-
ance, parties to principal-monitored and agent-monitored activities must
select a level of precautionary behavior. In principal-monitored activities,
the determination of precautionary behavior is based on the costs and ben-
efits to the principal as well as the costs and benefits to the agent. In
agent-monitored activities, however, only the agent's costs and benefits are
taken into account. This distinction has important implications for the ef-
fects of vicarious liability on the principal-agent relationship, and for the
efficiency of vicarious liability as a liability rule.
C. Optimal Agency Contracts Under Vicarious Liability
Under vicarious liability, the principal and the agent are jointly liable
for damages, and the optimal judgment-proof contract is unavailable to
the enterprise. If the enterprise's total assets are sufficient to cover its po-
tential tort liability, tort victims will be fully compensated. For simplicity,
the discussion below assumes that vicarious liability results in full com-
pensation to the tort victim.
For enterprises that choose the optimal solvency contract in the absence
of vicarious liability, the imposition of vicarious liability has no effect on
the expected utility of the parties or on the level of precautionary behavior
that they select."' Their preferred contract-the optimal solvency con-
tract-remains available to them, and hence they continue to operate
under that contract."1
In contrast, the imposition of vicarious liability on enterprises that
would otherwise select the optimal judgment-proof contract forces the
enterprise to shift to an optimal solvency cntract. After the imposition of
vicarious liability, the principal is liable for damages equal to the differ-
ence between the tort judgment and the amount of damages that the agent
can pay. Thus, the principal and the agent must select a new contract
from the set of solvency contracts that are available in the absence of
80. This result depends implicitly on the assumption that vicarious liability has no psychological
effect on the parties in the bargaining process that would cause the V* that prevails in the absence of
vicarious liability to change when vicarious liability is imposed. That assumption is reasonable in this
case because vicarious liability merely forecloses a set of options already rejected by the parties as
inferior. See Nash, The Bargaining Problem, 28 ECONOMETRICA 155 (1950) (axiom that exclusion of
inferior alternatives has no effect on outcome of bargaining process).
81. See app. IV infra (proving that vicarious liability has no effect on enterprise already operating
under optimal solvency contract and conducting incentive-independent activity).
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vicarious liability.
1. The Effects of Vicarious Liability on the Undertaking of Enterprise
Activities
For enterprises that would select the optimal judgment-proof contract
in the absence of vicarious liability, the imposition of vicarous liability
may deter the formation of the enterprise, and thereby eliminate the risk
of tort created by enterprise activity. Under a rule of vicarious liability,
the tort victim is fully compensated in the accident state of nature. Hence,
the expected profitability of the enterprise declines relative to its profit-
ability under the optimal judgment-proof contract. The fact that the par-
ties would have preferred the optimal judgment-proof contract implies
that the potential risk-sharing benefits of the new solvency contract are
insufficient to compensate the parties for this loss of profitability. Thus,
the new contract necessarily yields lower expected utility to either the
principal or the agent, or both. Depending upon their opportunity costs,
therefore, one or both of the parties may find that the enterprise is no
longer worthwhile. If so, the enterprise will not be formed and the attend-
ant risk of tort is avoided.
2. The Effects of Vicarious Liability on Precautionary Behavior
If the enterprise is involved in a principal-monitored or agent-moni-
tored activity, the imposition of vicarious liability can also affect the
amount that the enterprise spends on precautionary behavior, but only if
the enterprise would select the optimal judgment-proof contract in the ab-
sence of vicarious liability.82 In a principal-monitored activity, the effect of
vicarious liability on the level of precautionary behavior is generally inde-
terminate. If potential tort liability, x, is large relative to the agent's initial
wealth, y0, however, the enterprise has substantially more wealth at risk
under vicarious liability-when the entire tort judgment must be
paid-than in the absence of vicarious liability-when only the agent's
initial wealth is available to satisfy the tort judgment. Hence, when x is
large relative to y0, vicarious liability tends to make precautions more
worthwhile to the enterprise83, and the level of precautionary behavior
tends to increase.
In agent-monitored activities, the imposition of vicarious liability gener-
82. In incentive-independent activities, precautionary behavior is unaffected by financial incentives
and the imposition of vicarious liability cannot affect the level of precautions. See p. 174 supra.
83. See app. V infra (analyzing effect of vicarious liability on precautionary behavior in principal-
monitored activity).
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ally reduces the level of precautionary behavior.8 4 Because the principal
must pay out a portion of his own wealth in the accident state, vicarious
liability tends to reduce the agent's allotment of enterprise income in the
no-accident state. In addition, if the parties conclude a risk-sharing agree-
ment that protects the agent from insolvency in the accident state, the
agent's incentive to prevent torts is further diminished. Because the agent
cannot be monitored in his choice of precautions, the level of precaution-
ary expenditures will fall.
D. Policy Implications
The preceding behavioral analysis of principal-agent relationships
under alternative liability rules, when integrated with principles of eco-
nomic efficiency, has a number of normative implications for the law of
vicarious liability. Economic efficiency (social wealth maximization)" re-
quires that if an activity is to be undertaken, the difference between the
social benefits and the social costs of the activity must be positive and at a
maximum. In other words, an activity is efficient if no alternative use of
the productive resources consumed by the activity can produce a greater
excess of social benefits over social costs. This criterion has several conse-
quences for the law of vicarious liability."
1. The Importance of Bargaining Over Risk Allocation
In the models developed above, the principal and the agent bargain over
the allocation of tort risks. If bargaining or the opportunity to bargain is
absent, however, vicarious liability does not in general promote efficiency.
If bargaining is absent because tort risks are not foreseen by the parties,
vicarious liability clearly has no effect on the incentives for efficient behav-
ior. But if bargaining is absent because its cost is wholly disproportionate
to the value of the enterprise to the parties, 7 vicarious liability may or
may not be efficient. For example, the imposition of vicarious liability
may deter the formation of an enterprise if the principal is unwilling to
bear a risk about which he has little information, and if neither party is
willing to pay the cost of determining and allocating the risk. Such a pro-
cess of risk allocation is unnecessary in the absence of vicarious liability.
84. See app. VI infra (showing that precautionary behavior declines or remains unchanged when
vicarious liability is imposed on agent-monitored activity).
85. See note 10 supra.
86. The discussion ignores the theory of the second best, which applies when other imperfections
are present in the economy. See Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theory of the Second Best, 24
REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
87. Concededly, the imposition of vicarious liability may make bargaining worthwhile even
though it is not worthwhile in the absence of vicarious liability.
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Hence, if the enterprise is socially worthwhile, vicarious liability may
undermine efficiency. On the other hand, vicarious liability may deter the
formation of inefficient enterprises, and all that can be said a priori is that
in the absence of bargaining, vicarious liability does not in general pro-
mote efficiency.
2. Vicarious Liability in the Presence of Bargaining
If the parties have an opportunity to bargain over risk allocation, the
efficiency implications of vicarious liability can be analyzed according to
the three types of activities considered in the model. Further implications
can be deduced concerning activities that lie somewhere in between princi-
pal-monitored and agent-monitored activities, along the continuum of
costly monitoring."9
If the opportunity to bargain exists, vicarious liability deters the forma-
tion of enterprises in which social costs exceed social benefits, irrespective
of the type of activity involved. In the absence of vicarious liability, enter-
prises may be designed to be judgment-proof. Such enterprises operate
without paying the full social costs of enterprise activities, which include
the costs of torts caused by the enterprise." By foreclosing the use of judg-
ment-proof contracts, vicarious liability forces enterprises to treat these so-
cial costs as costs of doing business, and thereby deters the formation of
enterprises in which social costs exceed social benefits.
Thus, for incentive-independent activities, vicarious liability is an effi-
cient rule. Precautionary behavior in such activities is not affected by the
liability rule, and hence the only efficiency issue is whether or not the
activity should be undertaken. By deterring the undertaking of inefficient
activities, vicarious liability unambiguously serves the efficiency goal.
Vicarious liability also promotes efficiency in enterprises that are en-
gaged in principal-monitored activities. It not only deters the formation of
such enterprises if their social costs exceed their social benefits, but it also
forces the parties to take account of the social costs of torts when choosing
the level of precautionary behavior. This ensures that the perceived mar-
ginal costs and benefits of precautionary expenditures fully reflect their
social costs and benefits.9
88. The mere presence of bargaining costs does not necessarily inject indeterminacy into the anal-
ysis. As long as the bargaining costs are sufficiently low for the parties to ascertain the nature of tort
risks and reach agreement on an allocation of those risks, bargaining costs can be largely ignored for
purposes of analysis.
89. See pp. 175-76 supra.
90. One can view tort costs as costs of the victims' activities, but the analysis in the text assumes
that the tort system optimally allocates losses between tortfeasors and tort victims.
91. As noted earlier, see p. 186 supra, vicarious liability may decrease or increase the level of
precautionary expenditures in principal-monitored activities, with an increase especially likely when
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In contrast, it is impossible to say a priori whether vicarious liability
promotes efficiency in enterprises that are engaged in agent-monitored ac-
tivities, despite the fact that it deters the formation of such enterprises if
their social costs exceed their social benefits. This ambiguity arises be-
cause of the negative effect of vicarious liability on precautionary expendi-
tures in enterprises in which social benefits exceed social costs. For exam-
ple, if the level of precautionary behavior taken by a judgment-proof
enterprise falls short of the social optimum, vicarious liability will usually
aggravate the problem by further reducing the agent's incentive to make
precautionary expenditures.92 Of course, if tort damages fully compensate
tort victims for their losses, victims will generally prefer vicarious liability
to its absence. Because vicarious liability tends to increase the number of
torts, however, inefficiency may result from the attendant increase in the
social costs of torts, though concededly those costs are borne by tortfeasors
rather than by tort victims. Furthermore, because the tort system does not
always provide full compensation to victims, victims may collectively pre-
fer to trade compensation under vicarious liability for a lower accident
probability. Thus, vicarious liability may even be undesirable from the
victim's perspective.
3. Extensions of the Analysis to Intermediate Activities
Because principal-monitored activities and agent-monitored activities
represent two endpoints on a continuum,93 it is important to examine the
efficiency implications of vicarious liability for activities in which monitor-
ing is neither trivially costly nor prohibitively costly. These implications
may be derived from modest extensions of the arguments developed above.
Recall that the efficiency criterion has ambiguous implications for the
imposition of vicarious liability in agent-monitored activities because of
the presence of moral hazard-the ability of the agent to choose precau-
tionary behavior to maximize his own expected utility without taking into
account possible adverse effects on the principal's expected utility. Assume
for the moment that moral hazard can be eliminated by the principal at
some non-prohibitive positive cost. If the imposition of vicarious liability
leads the principal to incur such a cost, then vicarious liability is efficient
just as if the activity in question were a principal-monitored activity. So-
cially inefficient enterprises will not be formed, and precautionary ex-
the agent's initial wealth, y0, is small relative to the potential tort liability, x. See note 69 supra; app.
V infra. Regardless of whether precautionary expenditures increase or decrease as a result of vicarious
liability, however, the change is efficient because vicarious liability eliminates the disparity between
private costs and benefits and social costs and benefits.
92. See pp. 186-87 supra; app. VI infra.
93. See pp. 175-76 supra.
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penditures will be chosen with reference to their full social costs and bene-
fits. On the other hand, if the cost of eliminating moral hazard is
excessive, it will not be incurred, moral hazard will persist, and the impo-
sition of vicarious liability may not promote efficiency. Hence, the issue is
whether vicarious liability will lead the principal to incur the cost neces-
sary to eliminate moral hazard. That cost will be incurred if, from the
principal's perspective, it is sufficiently smaller than the cost of allowing
moral hazard to persist. Thus, if the elimination of moral hazard is "cost-
effective" for the principal, vicarious liability should be imposed because
the activity in question is "reasonably close" to a principal-monitored
activity.
Assume now that moral hazard cannot be completely eliminated, but
that the principal can nonetheless reduce moral hazard at some positive
cost.94 If the principal incurs such a cost and reduces moral hazard, the
difference between the actual precautionary behavior of the enterprise and
the precautionary behavior of the enterprise in the absence of moral haz-
ard will be reduced.95 Concomitantly, the likelihood that vicarious liability
will lead to significant inefficiencies is reduced. If moral hazard can be
significantly reduced at a reasonably low cost, therefore, vicarious liability
again should be imposed because the activity is "reasonably close" to a
principal-monitored activity.
4. Implications for the Law of Vicarious Liability
The efficiency analysis above suggests guidelines for the law of vicari-
ous liability. Because efficiency is the sole basis for these guidelines, how-
ever, they are subject to the caveat that equity and distributive justice may
sometimes support alternative liability rules.
When a tort occurs, efficiency requires that the court first consider
whether the principal and the agent had the opportunity to ascertain the
nature of tort risks, and to allocate those risks. If such an opportunity was
absent, efficiency may or may not result from the imposition of vicarious
liability.
If an opportunity for risk allocation between the parties was present,
the next task is to classify the activity that generated the tort as incentive-
independent, principal-monitored, agent-monitored, or "reasonably close"
to principal-monitored or agent-monitored. To this end, the first question
is whether or not financial incentives were important to the choice of pre-
cautionary behavior. If not, then the activity was incentive-independent,
94. "Surprise" inspections, for example, may increase the agent's level of care, but not to the level
it would attain if the principal could supervise the agent at all times.
95. Cf. Holmstrom, supra note 75 (analyzing relation between quality of monitoring and extent of
parties' failure to attain "first-best" Pareto optimality); Shavell, supra note 75 (same).
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and the efficiency criterion supports the imposition of vicarious liability.
If financial incentives were important to the choice of precautionary
behavior, the next question concerns the ability of the principal to monitor
the agent's precautionary behavior. This requires an identification of the
cause of the tort, and the precaution or precautions that could have pre-
vented the tort. By examining the relevant precautions, it is possible to
ascertain the cost of requiring the agent to undertake such precautions,
and thereby to assess the principal's monitoring capability. Of course, in-
numerable factual considerations may serve as indicia of monitoring capa-
bility in this context."
If the principal had the ability to monitor the agent's choice of precau-
tions at little or no cost, or to monitor the agent's precautions at a reason-
ably low cost, then the activity was principal-monitored or reasonably
close to principal-monitored. Once again, efficiency supports the imposi-
tion of vicarious liability. In contrast, if the principal lacked the ability to
monitor the agent's precautionary behavior at all, or without incurring
unreasonably high costs, then the activity was agent-monitored or reason-
ably close to agent-monitored. Because vicarious liability may undermine
efficiency in such activities, the efficient legal rule is unclear. Thus, there
is some justification for declining to hold the principal liable for the
agent's torts.
III. Implications of the Model: The Concept of Control
Under current law, the primary criterion for the imposition of vicarious
liability is the "control test." According to the efficiency analysis above,
however, control is a compelling basis for vicarious liability only in certain
activities and only if control is interpreted as the ability of the principal to
monitor the precautionary behavior of the agent. The existing control test
is not in accord with these conclusions, although to some extent the weak-
nesses in the test have been circumvented by the creation of an exception
for inherently dangerous activities.
96. To give a few examples, if the precaution is a one-time act-such as the construction of a
fence-then the principal needs only a single act of observation to verify the use of the precaution.
Typically, the cost of a single observation of the agent's behavior is low, so the classification of the
associated activity as principal-monitored is often appropriate. Alternatively, if the precaution requires
a continuous pattern of careful behavior-such as the careful wiring of each electrical connection in a
large building-then monitoring requires continuous observation. Such a pattern of observation may
be quite costly, and classification of the associated activity as agent-monitored is often appropriate
unless the principal is normally in such close proximity to the agent that continuous observation is
reasonably inexpensive, or unless a reasonably inexpensive and effective "spot-inspection" system is
available.
Of course, some precautions may involve the use of highly technical skills or devices that are beyond
the understanding of the principal. Activities requiring such precautions are likely to be agent-moni-
tored activities regardless of whether monitoring requires a single or a continuous observation of the
agent's behavior.
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A. The Control Test
The factors that are taken into account by the control test often do not
capture the presence or absence of monitoring capability. Indeed, many of
the factors examined by the courts have nothing whatsoever to do with
monitoring.97 To the extent that the factors considered by the courts may
sometimes bear on monitoring capability, they nonetheless should not be
considered unless the nature of the relevant precautions suggests their rel-
evance.98 Even when courts examine potentially relevant factors, they do
not consistently discriminate between principal-monitored and agent-
monitored activities.
Moreover, efficiency analysis suggests that the principal's ability to
monitor the agent's precautionary behavior is irrelevant if financial incen-
tives do not affect the level of precautions-that is, if the agent conducts
an incentive-independent activity. Regardless of the degree of monitoring
capability, vicarious liability should always be imposed in such activities;99
the use of the control test can only lead to inefficient denials of vicarious
liability."'
Finally, the control test is applied whether or not the principal and the
agent have a reasonable opportunity consciously to allocate the risk of
torts. If the absence of conscious risk allocation is due to the unforeseeabil-
ity of the risk, vicarious liability neither promotes nor undermines effi-
ciency; if the absence of conscious risk allocation is due to the high costs of
investigating and negotiating over the risk,' vicarious liability may or
may not undermine efficiency."02 In either case, the control test is inappro-
97. See Sam Horne Motor & Implement Co. v. Gregg, 279 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1955) (auto dealer
held liable for negligent driving of auto salesman partly because dealer owned automobile). But see
Throop v. F.E. Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 382 P.2d 560 (1963) (defendant corporation held not
liable for salesman's motor vehicle tort because defendant could not exercise control over salesman's
method of driving).
98. See note 96 supra.
99. See p. 188 supra.
100. See, e.g., Throop v. F.E. Young & Co., 94 Ariz. 146, 382 P.2d 560 (1963); Sam Home
Motor & Implement Co. v. Gregg, 279 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1955); Glynn v. M.F.A. Mut. Ins. Co., 363
Mo. 896, 254 S.W.2d 623 (1953). All of these cases involved motor vehicle accidents caused by the
negligence of someone within the defendant principal's employ. Liability or non-liability in each case
was predicated on the court's application of the control test, but an issue of great importance in each
case should have been whether the activity of driving was an incentive-independent activity. Many
auto accidents probably involve momentary carelessness rather than conscious decisions not to exercise
due care. In such cases, the financial incentives created by the liability rule will not have a significant
effect on the precautions taken to prevent accidents. Monitoring capability is therefore immaterial to
the efficient liability rule for such cases, see p. 188 supra, and vicarious liability should be imposed
as long as the parties have had a reasonable opportunity to foresee and allocate the risks of auto
accident liability. See pp. 187-88 supra.
101. Conceivably, vicarious liability may promote efficiency in these cases by creating incentives
for the conscious allocation of risk, but this possibility is speculative and does not provide a clear
justification for vicarious liability when risk allocation costs are inordinately high.
102. See pp. 187-88 supra.
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priate, and its legal implications bear no predictable relationship to eco-
nomic efficiency.
Concededly, the problems with the control test do not always lead to
outcomes that differ from the outcomes that would be achieved if the prin-
ciples in this Note were followed."0 3 Nonetheless, because the concept of
control is ill-defined and often inappropriately applied, the control test
frequently generates objectionable results.
Service Station Tort Cases and the Control Test. The problems with
the control test are illustrated by the case law concerning the liability of
parent oil companies for the torts of service station operators and their
employees. When a service station operator or one of his employees com-
mits a tort, the victim frequently seeks recovery from the station operator's
principal-the parent oil company. The oil companies often contest their
liability in these cases, and the outcome usually turns upon the courts'
application of the control test."04
Frequently, the courts find that the oil company has insufficient control
over the station operator to justify the imposition of vicarious liability. °0
Among the factors that the courts cite as indicative of a lack of control are
the operator's control over the hours of operation,1 6 the hiring and firing
of employees,' 7 and the prices charged for products.' 8 Courts that find
control on the part of the oil companies cite such factors as exclusive sales
agreements," 9 clean restroom clauses in the franchise agreements,' 0 and
opportunities for the oil companies to suggest retail prices."' None of the
factors noted above, however, relate closely or consistently to the ability of
oil companies to monitor the precautionary behavior of service station op-
103. See Sam Home Motor & Implement Co. v. Gregg, 279 S.W.2d 755 (Ky. 1955). Vicarious
liability was imposed in this case based upon a concept of control that was inconsistent with the
concept of control developed in this Note. See note 100 supra. The decision to impose vicarious liabil-
ity may have been warranted under the principles in this Note, however, if the activity of driving was
an incentive-independent activity.
104. Cf Davis, Service Station Torts: Time for the Oil Companies to Assume Their Share of the
Responsibility, 10 CAL. W. L. REV. 382 (1975) (survey of service station cases including discussion of
control test); Toner, Liability of Oil Companies for the Torts of Service Station Operators, 7 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 263, 264 (1972) (same).
105. In one annotation, about two-thirds of approximately sixty cases held that, as a matter
of law, the service station operator was an independent contractor. Most of the remaining cases held
that a jury question existed as to the status of the operator as servant or independent contractor.
Annot., 83 A.L.R.2D 1282 (1962).
106. See, e.g., Smith v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 346 F.2d 349, 351 (7th Cir. 1965); Hoover v. Sun
Oil Co., 58 Del. 553, 556, 212 A.2d 214, 215 (1965).
107. See, e.g., Drum v. Pure Oil Co., 184 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Texas Co.
v. Wheat, 140 Tex. 468, 473, 168 S.W.2d 632, 635 (1943).
108. See, e.g., Drum v. Pure Oil Co., 184 So. 2d 196, 197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966); Levine v.
Standard Oil Co., 249 Miss. 651, 654, 163 So. 2d 750, 751 (1964).
109. See Cooper v. Graham, 231 S.C. 404, 410, 98 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1957).
110. See Dorsic v. Kurtin & Richfield Oil Co., 19 Cal. App. 3d 226, 238-39, 96 Cal. Rep. 528,
537 (2d. Dist. 1971).
111. See Cooper v. Graham, 231 S.C. 404, 411, 98 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1957).
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erators. Whether the tort is caused by a patch of grease,"2 exploding gaso-
line,"1 3 faulty repairs, ' 4 or some other condition attributable to the opera-
tor's negligence,"1 5 the ability of the oil company to control factors such as
hours of operation, prices and restroom cleanliness has minimal bearing
on its ability to monitor behavior that would reduce the risk of tort liabil-
ity. Even a factor such as the ability to hire and fire employees, which
may be relevant to monitoring capability, should not be considered by a
court unless the nature of the relevant precautions suggests its importance.
Moreover, another important question-whether financial incentives
have an effect on the level of precautionary behavior-is not addressed in
any of the service station cases. Thus, the law that courts apply in these
cases is inconsistent with the efficiency analysis in this Note, and the re-
sults in the cases bear little relationship to the decision criteria suggested
above." 6
112. E.g., Dorsicv. Kurtin & Richfield Oil Co., 19 Cal. App. 3d 226,96 Cal. Rep. 795 (2d. Dist.
1971); Green v. Independent Oil Co., 414 Pa. 477, 201 A.2d 207 (1964).
113. E.g., BP Oil Co. v. Mabe, 279 Md. 632, 370 A.2d 554 (1976); Elkins v. Husky Oil Co., 153
Mont. 159, 455 P.2d 239 (1969).
114. E.g., Levine v. Standard Oil Co., 249 Miss. 651, 163 So.2d 750 (1964); Coe v. Esau &
Continental Oil Co., 377 P.2d 815 (Okla. 1963).
115. E.g., Apple v. Standard Oil, 307 F. Supp. 107 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (child bitten by operator's
guard dog); Beckham v. Exxon Corp., 539 S.W.2d 217 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (driver of wrecker
collided with plaintiff's automobile).
116. Consider the case of Hoover v. Sun Oil Co., 58 Del. 553, 212 A.2d 214 (1965), in which the
operator was found to be an independent contractor. In Hoover, the plaintiff's car caught fire while
being fueled by the defendant's service station attendant. The court held that the oil company lacked
control over the operator because of the operator's control over the hours of the station's operation and
the pay scales of the employees, and because of the lack of a contractual obligation on the part of the
operator to follow the business advice of an oil company sales representative.
Had the court focused directly on the ability of Sun Oil to monitor the fueling of each automobile
that visited the station, it undoubtedly would have concluded that such an ability was absent. Moni-
toring ability may have been irrelevant, however, because the activity of dispensing gasoline may have
been an incentive-independent activity-financial incentives may have had no bearing on the attend-
ant's level of care prior to the fire. If so, then the denial of vicarious liability was unambiguously
inefficient in Hoover despite the absence of monitoring ability.
In contrast to Hoover, consider Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d
995 (1949), which arose from the following sequence of events. A customer drove into the defendant's
station and parked her car for repairs. Before the station attendants had an opportunity to begin
repairs on the vehicle, it rolled down a hill and struck a pedestrian. The jury found that the station
attendants were negligent for failing to inspect the emergency brake and for leaving the car unat-
tended. The jury then applied the control test and found the station operator to be a servant of
Humble. On appeal, the court held that because Humble furnished the station with certain equip-
ment, conducted widespread advertising on behalf of its stations, supplied a portion of the station's
operating costs, and required the operator to perform miscellaneous duties, there was sufficient evi-
dence of control to support the jury verdict.
None of these factors, cited by the court as evidence of control, demonstrates Humble's ability to
monitor effectively the use of precautions that would have avoided the tort. It is virtually inconceivable
that a parent oil company could effectively require its agent, the station operator, to inspect promptly
the parking brake on every vehicle brought in for service.
The accident that gave rise to the Martin litigation, however, probably was not attributable to
calculated imprudence on the part of the operator. If so, the activity that gave rise to the tort was an
incentive-independent activity, and the court's decision to impose vicarious liability was an unambigu-
ously efficient outcome in the case despite the fact that Humble could not monitor the station operator.
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B. The Inherently Dangerous Activity Exception to the Independent
Contractor Rule
Generally, employers are not liable for the torts of their independent
contractors, but several exceptions to this rule have developed," 7 including
an exception for torts that are committed during the course of an inher-
ently dangerous activity."' Inherently dangerous activity cases" 9 may be
divided roughly into two categories.
The first category consists of cases in which the activity of the defen-
dant's independent contractor creates an unusual risk, recognizable in ad-
vance, for which special precautions are required to prevent an undue risk
of harm.2 ' In many of these cases, special precautions are needed prior to
the time the risky activity is undertaken.'
2'
In cases that belong to this first category, the principal can exert consid-
erable control over the use of precautions without incurring substantial
costs. If the risks of torts are recognizable in advance, and special precau-
tions are available to mitigate those risks, then appropriate precautions
can be contractually required by the principal. Most importantly, if the
agent must undertake specific, one-time precautions prior to or during the
course of the activity, the principal typically has an opportunity costlessly
or inexpensively to verify the agent's use of precautions. 22 This group of
inherently dangerous activities, therefore, corresponds closely to principal-
monitored activities, and the imposition of vicarious liability is consistent
with the efficiency analysis developed above.
The second category of inherently dangerous activity cases are those
involving ultrahazardous activities. Activities falling into this category are
considered dangerous regardless of the precautions taken.12 1 Individuals
117. See note 17 supra.
118. See W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 472.
119. The inherently dangerous activity exception arose from the English case of Bower v. Peate, 1
Q.B.D. 321 (1876), cited in W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 472, in which a principal was held liable
when his independent contractor negligently undermined the foundation of an adjacent building dur-
ing the course of an excavation. Following Bower, the Restatement of Torts provides an exception to
the independent contractor rule for activities that are likely to be dangerous unless special precautions
are taken. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 416 (1965).
120. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 472.
121. Construction or repair work on buildings adjacent to a public highway is inherently danger-
ous. See, e.g., Whalen v. Shivek, 326 Mass. 142, 93 N.E.2d 393 (1950); Rohlfs v. Weil, 271 N.Y.
444, 3 N.E.2d 588 (1936). Before such work begins, precautions are required to redirect endangered
traffic, and to protect passing pedestrians.
122. The demolition of a highway or brick wall is regarded as inherently dangerous. See, e.g.,
Bonczkiewicz v. Merberg Wrecking Corp., 148 Conn. 573, 172 A.2d 917 (1961); Hevel v. Stangier,
238 Ore. 44, 393 P.2d 201 (1964). Before demolition begins, the area should be roped or fenced off,
and signs should be posted, to prevent individuals from accidentally wandering into danger. Such
precautions are easily verifiable by a principal, who therefore has considerable control over their
utilization.
123. See note 32 supra.
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who conduct such activities are normally subject to strict liability.12
These cases also are consistent with the efficiency analysis developed
above, perhaps not because of the principal's ability to monitor precau-
tionary activity, but because precautionary behavior cannot eliminate the
serious risks of harm in such activities. Hence, to the extent that activities
in this group do not resemble principal-monitored activities, they have the
characteristics of incentive independent activities,22 and vicarious liability
is the efficient liability rule.
Conclusion
The efficiency analysis in this Note provides a normative framework
within which to administer the law of vicarious liability, subject of course
to any countervailing equitable considerations. Concededly, the framework
admits to some indeterminacy, but it identifies the crucial factors: the exis-
tence of an opportunity for conscious allocation of tort risks between the
principal and the agent, the effects of financial incentives on precautionary
behavior, and the ability of the principal to monitor the precautionary
behavior of the agent.
In analyzing the issues in a particular case, a court should first ask
whether the principal and the agent knew or should have known of the
risks inherent in the activity that caused the tort, and whether they had a
reasonable opportunity to allocate those risks. If the answer to either
question is negative, efficiency analysis provides little or no guidance to
the court, and equitable considerations alone should dictate the outcome.
If the answers to both questions are affirmative, however, the court
should ask next whether the level of precautionary behavior was sensitive
to the financial incentives facing the enterprise. If not, then vicarious lia-
bility is dearly the efficient liability rule.
If the court finds that financial incentives were important to the choice
of precautionary behavior, the next question is whether the principal had
the ability to monitor the agent's precautionary behavior. If the principal
was able to monitor the agent reasonably well, then vicarious liability is
the efficient rule. If the principal lacked a reasonable monitoring capabil-
124. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, at 472.
125. To be sure, the risks of ultrahazardous activities may be reduced by precautions, but sub-
stantial risks remain. If, because of the high degree of danger, the available precautions in these
activities are taken regardless of the liability rule (that is, the liability rule does not affect the margi-
nal incentives for precautions), then ultrahazardous activities are incentive-independent under the def-
inition given above, see p. 174 supra, and vicarious liability is the appropriate liability rule. If the
available precautions are sensitive to financial incentives, however, they probably involve single ob-
servable acts at particular points in time. If so, the principal can exercise control over the precautions,
and the activity is most likely a principal-monitored activity. Again, vicarious liability is the appropri-
ate liability rule.
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ity, however, vicarious liability may be inefficient. It deters the formation
of enterprises in which social costs exceed social benefits, but it also tends
to increase the number of torts, perhaps to the detriment of efficiency, by
diluting the agent's incentives for precautionary behavior. A decision not
to impose vicarious liability in these circumstances is not irrational under
the efficiency criterion.
The existing law of vicarious liability departs significantly from this
framework. Courts have not employed the control test in a way that con-
sistently captures the principal's ability to monitor the agent's precaution-
ary behavior. Moreover, they apply the control test when the issue of
monitoring capability is, from the standpoint of efficiency, immaterial to
the issue of whether to impose vicarious liability. To some extent, how-
ever, the law has circumvented these characteristics of the existing control
test by creating the inherently dangerous activities exception, which is
generally consistent with the normative principles in this Note.
Appendix I. The Importance of Liability Rules
Liability rules are important for two reasons. First, they represent an assign-
ment of entitlements; if individual A is liable to individual B in tort, B has, in
effect, an entitlement to the status quo upset by the tort. See Calabresi and Me-
lamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Ca-
thedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972). As entitlements, liability rules
have significant distributional consequences.
Liability rules are also important because, in the presence of market failure,
they may affect economic efficiency by creating incentives for efficient or ineffi-
cient behavior. See G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970). If society
can act collectively in a costless fashion, however, or if the market can replicate
the results of collective action, economic efficiency will be achieved regardless of
the choice of a liability rule. See Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L.
ECON. 1 (1960) (original statement of "Coase theorem"). Accordingly, the effi-
ciency analysis of alternative liability rules in this Note presumes both a failure
of collective action and a failure of the market to replicate collective action.
A. Failure of Collective Action
Suppose, for purposes of illustration, that a totally judgment-proof agent who
is employed by a wealthy principal contemplates an activity that, with certainty,
will impose a cost of $x on society. Suppose further that both the principal and
the agent are interested solely in maximizing the expected profits of the enter-
prise, which will be split between them in some predetermined way.
Under a rule of vicarious liability, the principal is liable to society for the
entire Sx in damages, and the enterprise will undertake the activity only if its
gross contribution to profit exceeds Sx. In the absence of monopoly power, exter-
nalities, or other market imperfections, economic efficiency is achieved because the
activity will be undertaken only if its social benefit exceeds its social cost of $x.
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Cf. H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 203-207 (1978) (discussion of
externalities).
In the absence of vicarious liability, but with costless collective action, society
will recognize that the agent is unable to pay damages, and therefore will offer
the enterprise a "bribe" of up to $x not to engage in the activity. Once again, the
enterprise will undertake the activity only if its gross contribution to profit ex-
ceeds $x, and economic efficiency is achieved. Thus, with costless collective action,
either liability rule is consistent with efficiency.
Contrary to the basic assumption of the analysis above, however, collective ac-
tion of the sort necessary to generate the "bribe" is obviously quite costly, espe-
cially when the number of potential tort victims is large. Consequently, collective
bribes will rarely be offered, and in the absence of vicarious liability, the enter-
prise will undertake the activity if its gross profits exceed the amount of the
agent's assets available for the satisfaction of a tort judgment. Hence, the enter-
prise may undertake the activity even if it is socially inefficient.
B. Failure of the Market to Replicate Collective Action
Despite the failure of collective action, a market solution to the efficiency prob-
lem may emerge. Suppose that torts occur only during or after some voluntary
transaction in which an enterprise sells goods or services to a tort victim-for
example, a tort caused by the failure of an auto mechanic to bolt on a customer's
wheels. Assume that all enterprises are run by judgment-proof agents, and that
there is no vicarious liability. If the market conveys perfect information about the
propensity of each enterprise to commit torts, then relatively "safe" enterprises
are able to charge higher prices than relatively "unsafe" enterprises, the differ-
ence reflecting the lower expected cost to customers of a transaction with the
"safe" enterprise. Thus, appropriate incentives for safety are created, because
each enterprise realizes that unsafe behavior is penalized in the form of lost prof-
its equal to the expected social cost of such behavior. In essence, the market repli-
cates the results of collective action by offering the enterprise a "bribe" to behave
safely, and economic efficiency is attained even though judgment-proof enterprises
are unable to pay tort damages.
Like the collective action solution, however, this type of market solution to the
problem of judgment-proof agents is beset with difficulties that suggest the impor-
tance of the proper liability rule. First, this solution cannot work in the absence
of a voluntary market transaction between the enterprise and the tort victim.
Hence, for example, it does not provide incentives for judgment-proof con-
tractors to avoid injuries to children playing near a construction site. Second, it
assumes a quality and quantity of information in the market that is rarely pre-
sent. Cf Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Qualitative Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (discussing effects of poor infor-
mation on operation of markets).
In summary, the efficiency problems created by judgment-proof enterprises are
unlikely to be solved by the market. Liability rules can be used to promote effi-
ciency, therefore, as well as to promote an equitable distribution of wealth.
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Appendix II. Optimal Agency Contracts for Principal-Monitored Activities
For simplicity, assume that precautionary behavior takes the form of dollar
expenditures on precautions, denoted by e. There is no loss of generality in as-
suming that the agent incurs all precautionary expenditures, because the agent's
share of enterprise income in each state of nature can be adjusted to compensate.
In addition, assume that precautionary expenditures affect the probability of the
tort but not the magnitude of damages. Then, let p(e) be the probability of the
accident. The remainder of the notation is consistent with the model of agency
contracts for incentive-independent activities. See pp. 176-82 supra.
The final assumption concerns the shape of p(e). It is realistic and mathemati-
cally useful to assume that precautionary expenditures reduce the probability of
the tort at a decreasing rate. That is, p(e) reflects diminishing returns to precau-
tionary expenditures. This assumption implies that p(e) is decreasing and convex
(p'(e) < 0 and p"(e) > 0.)
Under these assumptions, the expected utility of the principal is given by
E[V(w)] = [1-p(e)]V(mo+mn) + p(e)V(mo+ma)
The expected utility of the agent is given by
E[U(w)] = [1-p(e)]U(yo+yn-e) + p(e)U(yo+ya-x-e)
for values of ya and e such that ya-e > x-yo, and
E[U(w)] = [1-p(e)]U(y 0 +Yn-e) + p(e)U(0)
for values of ya and e such that ya-e < x-y0 .
The Pareto optimal contract is found as the solution to the following problem:
maximize E[U(w)] over all mn, ma, Yn, Ya' e,
subject to the constraints:
(Al) E[V(w)] > V*,
(A2) ma+y a <=r; mn+Y 
< r, <
(A3) Yn < m0 +Tr; Ya 
< mo+?r, mn < yO+ r-e; ma < yo+ wx-e, and
(A4) ya > 0.
which have the same interpretation as those for incentive-independent activities.
See pp. 179-80 supra.
Utilizing the assumptions employed above, see notes 58-59 supra, constraints
(A2) always hold with equality (mn =l/r-yn and ma =7'-ya), and constraints
(A3) never hold with equality. As shown below, the fraudulent conveyance con-
straint may or may not hold with equality.
A. The Optimal Solvency Contract
If the agent is to be solvent in the accident state, then ya > 0 (assuming x >
y0). Thus, aside from the constraint on the principal's utility level, the only con-
straint on the optimization problem is the solvency constraint given by y0 +Ya-x-e
> 0.
The Yale Law Journal
The problem of finding the optimal solvency contract now can be stated as:




Using Lagrange multipliers X and 7 for the constraint on the principal's utility
and the solvency constraint; respectively, the following five conditions are neces-
sary for an optimum:
(1) [1-p(e)]U'(y 0 +Yn-e) -X [1-p(e)]V'(m 0 +'7r-yn) 0
(2) p(e)U'(yo+Ya-x-e) - X p(e)V'(mo+ 7r-ya) + f7 - 0
(3) p'(e)[U(yo+Ya-x-e) - U(Yo+Yn-e)]
+XP'()[V(mo+7r-ya) - V(mo+w7-Yn)] <
[1-p(e)]U'(y0 +yn-e) + p(e)U'(y0 +Ya-x-e) +f1
Condition (3) holds with equality if e > 0 at the optimum.
(4) yo+Ya--e > 0; 17 (yo+ya-x-e) = 0
Finally, because the marginal utility of wealth is positive for both parties,X>0,
and hence
(5) [1-p(e)]V(m 0 +7r-yn) + p(e)V(mo+'r-ya) = V*
Conditions (1), (2), (4) and (5) are conceptually equivalent to conditions (a)-
(d), see note 63 supra, and they have the same basic implications for optimal risk
sharing between the principal and the agent. See note 67 supra.
The crucial difference between this problem and the parallel problem for in-
centive-independent activities lies in condition (3), which determines the optimal
choice of e given Yn and Ya. The left hand side of (3) represents the marginal
benefit of precautionary expenditures-the marginal gain in the expected utility
to both parties from a marginal expenditure on precautions. The right hand side
represents the marginal cost of precautionary expenditures-the marginal de-
crease in the agent's expected utility from a marginal dollar spent on precautions.
Thus, condition (3) states that, at the optimum, the marginal benefit of precau-
tionary expenditures is no greater than the marginal cost, and is equal to the
marginal cost if precautionary expenditures are positive.
B. The Optimal Judgment Proof Contract
The optimal judgment-proof contract requires that Ya be as small as possible
given the fraudulent conveyance constraint and the level of precautionary behav-
ior. This fact implies that Ya = 0 if e <yo at the optimum, or ya = e-y0 if e>
Yo at the optimum. Larger values of Ya would decrease the principal's utility
without increasing the agent's utility because the increment in ya would be paid
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entirely to the tort victim as compensation.
The determination of the optimal judgment-proof contract is more complex
than in the case of incentive-independent activities, however, because the parties
must choose the optimal value of e. It is necessary, therefore, to solve the follow-
ing problem:
max E[U(w)] - [1-p(e)]U(Y0 +Yn-e) + p(e)U(O) over all Yn,e,
subject to E[V(w)] > V*.
The necessary conditions are:
(6) [1-p(e)]U'(yo+Yn-e) - X [1-p(e)]V'(mo+ "/r-yn) - 0
(7) p'(e)[U(O) - U(yo+yn-e)] +
X p'(e)[V(mo+7r) - V(mo+r-yn) ] <[1-p(e)]U'(yo+Yn-e)
if e <Yo at the optimum, or
(7)' p'(e)[U(O) - U(YO+Yn-e) ] +
Xp'(e)[V(mo+l/-e+yo) - V(mo+'7r-yn) ] <
[1-p(e)]U'(y 0 +Yn-e) +.p(e)V'(mo+7r-e+y o)
if e > Yo at the optimum, and
(8) [1-p(e)]V(m 0+7r-yn) + p(e)V(mo+r-ya) = V*
where Ya== if e < Yo at the optimum, and ya=e-yo if e > Yo at the
optimum.
Condition (7) holds with equality if the optimal value of e lies between 0 and yo,
and condition (7)' holds with equality if the optimal value of e is greater than Yo.
Conditions (7) and (7)' have essentially the same interpretation as condition
(3). They state that if the optimum falls interior to the relevant interval [0 < e
< yo in the case of (7), e > yo in the case of (7)'], then the marginal cost of
precautionary expenditures is equal to their marginal benefit. If the optimal value
of e falls at the lower boundary of the relevant interval [e = 0 in the case of (7),
e=y0 in the case of (7)'], then marginal benefit must be less than or equal to
marginal cost at that point.
C. The Pareto Optimal Contract
The principal and the agent compare the optimal solvency contract to the opti-
mal judgment-proof contract, and select the one that maximizes the agent's utility
given the value of V*. Again, one cannot say a priori which one the parties will
prefer. Their choice has important implications, however, for the level of precau-
tionary behavior. Moreover, the effects of vicarious liability on the level of pre-
cautionary behavior depend critically upon which of the two contracts is preferred
in the absence of vicarious liability. See app. IV infra; app. V infra.
The factors relevant to the choice between the optimal solvency contract and
the optimal judgment-proof contract are essentially the same as those relevant in
the case of incentive-independent activities. See note 69 supra. Specifically, the
more risk averse the agent, the more likely it is that the optimal solvency contract
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will be chosen. If both parties are risk neutral (expected profit maximizing), then
the optimal judgment-proof contract is chosen because it maximizes the expected
value of total enterprise wealth.
In addition, the larger the value of x (other things equal), the greater is the
incentive to choose a judgment-proof contract and thereby to avoid a substantial
portion of tort liability. Concomitantly, the smaller the value of yo, the lower is
the utility to the agent of the optimal solvency contract, and the more likely it is
that the parties will choose the judgment-proof contract.
Appendix III. The Determination of Precautionary Behavior in Agent-
Monitored Activities
Absent supervision by the principal, the agent chooses the level of precaution-
ary expenditure, e, to maximize his expected utility, contingent on the values of
9n and Ya established in the agency contract. Suppose that 9Tn and Ya are the
agent's payoffs under a particular contract. Then, the agent chooses e to
maximize E[U(w)]
subject to Yn = 9n ; Ya = 9a"
There are two possible solutions to this problem:
i. At the optimum, the agent's wealth in the accident state is positive. If the
agent has positive wealth in the accident state, then y0 + a-x-e > 0.
Thus, e must have been chosen so that this inequality holds. The neces-
sary condition corresponding to such a choice of e is given by:
(9) -p'(e)U(Yo+9n-e) < [1-p(e)]U(Yo+ n-e)
+ p(e)U'(yo+9a-x-e) - p'(e)U(y0 +a-x-e)
Condition (9) holds with equality when 0 < e < y0+ga-X.
ii. At the optimum, the agent's wealth in the accident state is zero. Insol-
vency in the accident state implies that y0 + a - x -e < 0. The necessary
condition for optimality under these circumstances is given by:
(10) -p'(e)U(y0 + n-e) < [1-p(e)]U'(y 0 +9n-e) - p'(e)U(0)
Condition (10) holds with equality when e > max(0,yo+9a-x).
The interpretation of conditions (9) and (10) is completely analagous to the
interpretation of condition (3) in Appendix II. Each left-hand side represents the
marginal benefit of precautions, and each right-hand side represents the marginal
cost of precautions.
Appendix IV. The Effects of Vicarious Liability on Enterprises That Prefer
the Optimal Solvency Contract in the Absence of Vicarious
Liability
This appendix proves that if an enterprise prefers the optimal solvency contract
in the absence of vicarious liability, the imposition of vicarious liability will have
no effect on the optimal contract. See p. 185 supra. In the interest of brevity, the
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analysis is limited to incentive-independent activities, but it can be extended to
cover all of the activities discussed in the text.
After the imposition of vicarious liability, let the agent's payoffs in the accident
and no-accident states be denoted as Ya and Yn, respectively. Net enterprise in-
come is i' in the no-accident state and 71-x in the accident state. The Pareto opti-
mal contract represents the solution to the following problem:
maximize E[U(w)] = (1-p)U(y 0+jn) + pU(y0 + a),
subject to:
E[V(w)] = (1-p)V(m 0 +1r- n) + pV(m0 +71r-x-a) >_ V*
Ya = -y0
and subject to other constraints that are assumed to be non-binding. See note 59
supra. Of course, under vicarious liability, the fraudulent conveyance constraint
does not restrict the choice of Ya"
Let ) be the multiplier for the constraint on the principal's utility, and let 7
be the multiplier for the constraint on Ya" Under prior assumptions, see note 63
supra, the following conditions are necessary and sufficient for a global optimum:
(a)" (1-p)U'(y 0 +n) -A(1-p)V'(m0 +1r-n) 0
(b)" pU'(y0 +%a) - XpV'(m0+r-x-a) + 77 - 0
(c)" % > -Yo ;77 (Yo +Ya) = 0
(d)" (1-p)V(m0 + 7-jn) + pV(m 0+ 7r-x-%a) V*
Note the implicit assumption that mo+W7 l-x-a is strictly positive at the opti-
mum because of the constraint on the principal's utility.
Compare conditions (a)" - (d)" with conditions (a) - (d) in note 63 supra. Let
y*, y* be the solution to conditions (a) -(d), and let ~*, be the solution to
conditions (a)"-(d)". If V* in condition (d) equals V* in condition (d)", then j*
-yn and y*-x. In other words, if the bargaining parameter V* is
unaffected by the imposition of vicarious liability-as is quite probable, see note
80 supra-then the Pareto optimal contract under vicarious liability is identical to
the optimal solvency contract in the absence of vicarious liability.
Appendix V. The Effects of Vicarious Liability on Precautionary Behavior in a
Principal-Monitored Activity
Assume that the principal and the agent in a principal-monitored activity pre-
fer the optimal judgment-proof contract in the absence of vicarious liability. Their
level of precautionary expenditure is determined by conditions (6)-(8), app. II
supra. The imposition of vicarious liability, however, forces the enterprise to
adopt an optimal solvency contract, see pp. 185-86 supra, which is characterized
by conditions (1)-(5), app. II supra.
Because of the complexity of these conditions, and the indeterminacy of V* in
the model, however, it is difficult to use the general formulation of the model to
assess the effects of vicarious liability on precautionary behavior. Fortunately,
most of the important effects appear in the following, highly tractable special case
of the model.
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Assume that the principal and the agent both are risk neutral. Then, their
utility functions may be written as
U(w) = V(w) = w.
Therefore, condition (3), app. II supra, becomes
(3)" -p'(e) x < 1,
and condition (7), app. I supra, becomes
(7)" -p'(e) (yo-e) < 1 - p(e)
In this special case , (7)" and (9)" alone suffice to determine the optimal values
of e under the optimal solvency contract and the optimal judgment-proof contract.
Both conditions have a simple interpretation. Because the parties' utility de-
pends exclusively on their expected wealth, the Pareto optimal contract requires
that expected enterprise profits be at a maximum. In an enterprise that operates
under the optimal solvency contract, or under vicarious liability, the amount of
wealth at risk is x, and hence -p'(e)x in condition (3) is the addition to expected
profits from a marginal expenditure on precautions. The marginal cost of a dollar
spent on precautions is 1, and so (3)" states the familiar requirement that the
marginal benefit of precautionary expenditures be no greater than the marginal
cost, and equal to marginal cost if e > 0.
A similar interpretation holds for condition (7)". In an enterprise operating
under the optimal judgment-proof contract, the amount of wealth at risk is
(y0-e), and hence the margial benefit of a dollar expenditure on precautions is
-p'(e)(y0-e). The marginal cost of a dollar spent on precautions is only 1-p(e)
because a dollar saved out of y0 is paid to the tort victim with probability p(e).
For arbitrary choices of p(e), y0, and x > y0, it is unclear whether the value of
e that satisfies (3)" is greater or less than the value of e that satisfies (7)". Intui-
tively, the marginal benefit of precautions is lower under the optimal judgment-
proof contract, but the marginal cost of precautions is also lower, so that the
optimal value of e may be higher or lower. Hence, the effects of vicarious liability
on the level of precautionary behavior are indeterminate.
Conditions (3)" and (7)" yield conclusive results, however, about the effects of
y0 and x on the optimal value of e. Differentiating (3)" with respect to x and
(7)" with respect to y0 yields
( e -p'(e) > 0
-x p"(e)x
ae _ p'(e) 0
7 Y. -p"(e) + 2 p'(e)
Hence, an increase in the potential loss, x, causes an enterprise operating under
the optimal solvency contract to increase precautions, and an increase in the
agent's wealth at risk, y0, causes an enterprise operating under the optimal judg-
ment-proof contract to increase precautions. This result suggests that if x is suffi-
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ciently large or Yo is sufficiently small, precautionary expenditures tend to be
greater under vicarious liability than in the absence of vicarious liability.
Appendix VI. The Effects of Vicarious Liability on Precautionary Behavior in
an Agent-Monitored Activity
In an agent-monitored activity operating under the optimal judgment-proof
contract, the level of precautionary behavior is determined by condition (10), app.
III supra. In an agent-monitored activity operating under the optimal solvency
contract, or under vicarious liability, the level of precautionary behavior is deter-
mined by condition (9), app. III supra (if the agent's wealth is positive in the
accident state at the optimum), or condition (10), app. III supra (if the agent's
wealth is zero in the accident state at the optimum). These optimality conditions
yield conclusive results about the effects of vicarious liability on precautionary
behavior.
Assume that the parties prefer the optimal judgment-proof contract in the
absence of vicarious liability. Let the agent's allotment of enterprise income in the
no-accident state be denoted by yJ,. The agent's wealth in the accident state, of
course, is zero.
Consider the effects of imposing vicarious liability on the enterprise. The
principal's wealth in the accident state must decline because the agent's wealth in
the accident state is already at a minimum. By hypothesis, the parties prefer the
optimal judgment-proof contract; hence, vicarious liability inevitably reduces the
expected utility of one or both parties. Thus, it is compelling to assume that in
the bargaining process, no party obtains greater expected utility in the presence of
vicarious liability than in the absence of vicarious liability. Under this assump-
tion, the agent's wealth in the no-accident state, denoted by yV, must be less than
or equal to Yn, and if the agent's expected utility is strictly lower under vicarious
liability, then yV < yt. Consider two possible conditions.
(i) Under vicarious liability, the agent's wealth in the accident state is zero.
If this condition prevails, which corresponds to a full indemnity agreement,
then the level of precautionary expenditure, with and without vicarious liability,
is determined by condition (10), app. III supra. Let ei denote the level of precau-
tionary expenditures in the absence of vicarious liability. Then, the choice of eJ
must satisfy condition (10), which may be written
(10)1 -p'(eJ)U(y0 +yJn-e) < [1-p(e)]U'(yo+yJn-eJ) - p'(ei)U(0)
or, in terms of marginal costs (MC) and marginal benefits (MB),
(10)* MB _< MCi
Similarly, let ev denote the level of expenditure under vicarious liability. The
choice of ev must satisfy condition (10), which may be written
(10)v -p°(ev)U(yo+yn-ev) < [1-p(e)]U'(yo+yv-ev) - p°(ev)U(O)
or, alternatively,
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(10) v* MBv < MCV
Recall that yv < yJ, and that U(w) is an increasing, concave function. Now sup-
pose that e = eV. Based on a term by term comparison, it follows that MBJ _
MBv, and MOi < MCv. The marginal benefit "curves," MBv and MBj, are
downward sloping, however, and the marginal cost "curves," MCv and MC], are
upward sloping. It follows that if ev* is the optimal level of precautionary expen-
diture under vicarious liability and ei* is the optimal level of expenditure in the
absence of vicarious liability, ei* > ey*.
(ii) Under vicarious liability, the agent's wealth in the accident state is positive.
If this condition prevails, then the level of precautionary behavior in the ab-
sence of vicarious liability again is determined by (10)i, but the level of precau-
tionary behavior under vicarious liability is now determined by condition (9),
app. III supra, which may be written
(9)v -p'(eV)U(yo+yvn-e v) < [1-p(ev)]U'(yo+yv-ev)
+ p(eV)U'(yo+yv.e .x) -p'(eV)U(yo+yv.eV-x)
or, alternatively,
(9)v* MBV' < MCv"
where yv is the agent's allotment of enterprise income in the accident state. Now
suppose that eJ=eY. Based on a term by term comparison, it follows that MBj >
MBv' and MCO :< MCv'. As above, the marginal benefit "curves," MBj and
MBv', are both downward sloping, as is the marginal cost "curve," MC. In gen-
eral, however, MC v' is not everywhere downward sloping, but MCv' lies nowhere
below MC. Hence, it again follows that eJ* > eY*.
In general, therefore, under the compelling assumption that vicarious liability
does not increase the expected utility of either party, the level of precautionary
behavior in enterprises conducting agent-monitored activities declines or remains
unchanged after the imposition of vicarious liability. An actual decline in the level
of precautionary expenditure is likely because it requires only that vicarious lia-
bility reduce the expected utility of the agent, or that the principal and the agent
enter a risk-sharing agreement that provides the agent with positive wealth in the
accident state.
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